The Arab states' romance to the Palestine dilemma possesses been saturated by myth and misunderstanding. Unquestionably, the problem has been a significant aspect of modern day Arab politics. But while Arab says seemed to be strongly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, giving total, passionate backing for the Palestinian reason because the 1930s, they generally acted in a careful, constrained way predicated on national or self-interest.
For decades, the PLO depended on the Arab world's diplomatic, financial, and armed service support to survive and fight Israel. Next to a stated determination to eliminate Israel through violent means, the PLO Charter's most significant point was the declare that it had the right to demand the Arab says' complete support. This expectation was often disappointed. And whatever leverage the Palestinians once got was significantly eroded in the 1980s and 1990s by the PLO's own mistakes--incorporating backing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait--as well as shifting regional and worldwide politics.
Today, the Arab states' part in Israel-Palestinian issues, mainly because important as it may be, is less directly from the peace process's details and less at the mercy of Palestinian influence than it appears. Strong factors restrict the Arab says' willingness or capability to act. Their policy is founded on regime interests in addition to the new condition of regional politics, alliances, and vitality balances. This paper examines the basis of Palestinian and Israel relations with Arab claims, including Arab leaders' motives, tactics, and goals.
Once the PLO made its agreements with Israel, it might no more deny other Arabs a right to accomplish the same thing. Many Arab governments took the opportunity